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Abstract 
This thesis will examine the discourse of peak oil understood from a post-political perspective and 
challenge the un-reflexive assumption of peak oil as a natural challenger to current hegemony. It 
will do so by constructing a theoretical framework for ‘politics proper’ through which the peak oil 
discourse will be assessed. The conclusion is that while peak oil offer the potential of a serious 
rupture with the current regime; the discourse is also infused with apocalyptical imaginaries and 
populist maneuvers threatening to render such a rupture insignificant. The thesis warns against 
letting apolitical infusion obscure and hinder the illumination of proper political subjects and 
diverse alternatives to our current regime.  
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2. Introduction 
According to Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek there is only one true ideological question today, 
from which all following formulations must stem; “do we endorse the predominant naturalization 
of capitalism, or does today’s global capitalism contain antagonisms which are sufficiently strong 
to prevent its indefinite reproduction” (Žižek 2009:90f). Or put differently; are there problems 
within capitalism to warrant searching for an alternate social order, or can any current antagonisms 
be cured from within the capitalistic hegemony; a hegemony that since the fall of the Berlin wall 
and the east block more and more is promoted as the only practical, even the only possible way of 
organizing society.  
Žižek (2009) identifies four such antagonisms: the looming threat of ecological apocalypse, the 
notion of private property with regards to intellectual property, new techno-scientific 
developments (mainly in biotechnology), and lastly the creation of new apartheids (walls and 
boundaries of exclusion). The first three antagonisms assume opposition against the 
closure/privatization of ‘commons’, commons of culture: cognitive capital like language, education but 
also public healthcare, postal systems and roads etcetera; commons of external nature: depletion of 
natural resources, pollution, end to biodiversity etcetera; commons of internal nature: the biogenetic 
heritage of man and the creation of a ‘New Man’. These three antagonisms share a perception of 
potential destruction of realms, possibly even the destruction of civilization and humanity itself. 
Žižek (ibid) argues that it is, however, only by the last antagonism, the antagonism of the Included 
and the Excluded that we find a subversive edge. The other three antagonisms can only be rendered 
as challengers to hegemony by calling upon the antagonism of inclusion and exclusion (Žižek 2009).  
Within the first three antagonisms lies an inherent opportunity for ‘managerial fixes’. Ecological 
threats become issues of sustainable development, intellectual property legal challenges, and 
techno-scientific developments a question of ethics. Problems are formulated and solved within 
the hegemony. It is not too far-fetched to imagine society overcoming the above antagonisms 
without addressing the issue of inclusion and exclusion; a society where environmental issues, 
issues of intellectual property and techno-scientific dangers have been managed and rendered 
‘obsolete’; but where the stratification of power and the marked differences of the Included and 
the Excluded remain the same or even accentuated further. “[W]ithout the antagonism between 
the Included and the Excluded we may well find ourselves in a world in which Bill Gates is the 
greatest humanitarian battling against poverty and disease, and Rupert Murdoch the greatest 
environmentalist mobilizing hundreds of millions through his media empire” (Žižek 2009: 98). 
While the first three antagonisms concern the (economic, anthropological and physical) survival of 
society, and possibly humanity itself, the latter concerns that of egality and justice.  
In this thesis I will examine a specific discourse that is often labeled and handled as a potential 
antagonistic element to our world order in general and capitalism in particular; namely peak oil. I 
will claim, however, that while peak oil as formulated by its advocates might pose a serious threat 
to ‘our economies’ it does not by necessity challenge the social order of things. In fact I would 
claim that the contrary holds true. Existing power relations tend to be accentuated in times of crises 
as a result of the birth of populist movements and discontent. I will further explore the dangers of 
the peak oil discourse being far removed as a saving grace and a proper challenger to hegemony to 
instead be actively used as a populist tool to depoliticize discourse and reproduce hegemony and 
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claim that discourses aimed at environmental security are often articulated and reproduced from 
within and by the hegemonic regime, and as such fail to offer supersession and an actual challenge 
to hegemony.  
It is important to note that this thesis does not examine the issue of oil scarcity at any length. Nor 
does it refute that peak oil (or other Malthusian inspired discourses) might pose a real and very 
serious threat to our society. What is of interest to the author is how the discourse of peak oil is 
being presented by advocates of the peak oil discourse. More specifically the aim of this thesis is 
to scrutinize the popular claim that peak oil will revolutionize the world – and if so, what contents 
such a revolution would/could have. Further it is important to note that the need to actually 
challenge our current hegemony is a normative stance underpinning much of this thesis. But while 
various reasons for this necessity can be implicitly read throughout the thesis (for instance it is 
claimed that there can be no true democracy without challenging hegemony) – it is nonetheless a 
normative stance, and the thesis will not challenge or discuss that stance in any explicit detail. 
Barring this introductory chapter where the aim and goals of the thesis are outlined and a short 
presentation of the peak oil idea (see below) is presented, and not counting the methodological 
chapter where the theoretical framework underpinning the thesis is constructed, this thesis is 
divided into two parts. The first part (chapter 4) examines and develops a specific understanding 
of democracy and politics, asserting that we currently live in times that in practice and theory divert 
from the democratic ideals – that we live in a world best described as post-democratic and post-
political. The chapter ends with in mildly constructive streak, suggesting how politics can be 
reaffirmed and reinvented in a new guise; namely in and by agonistic confrontation. The second 
part (chapter 5) of the thesis analyses the predominant take on environment in general, and peak 
oil in particular. It attempts to dissect the peak oil discourse building on knowledge attained about 
post-democracy in the first part. Stressing that while peak oil accounts alternatively presents an 
inevitable apocalypse or a way to release us from the shackles of capitalism and build a better world 
order; both accounts hold the potential to foster populism and only further accentuate existing 
power relations and a reproduction of our hegemonic regime. I also make the claim that the peak 
oil discourse in recent years has changed and seemingly increased in sophistication. What this 
change can mean will be discussed towards the end of the second part of the thesis. 
2.2 Peak Oil crash course 
The term peak oil was at the turn of the millennia an unknown expression. Though Malthusian 
theories and discourses regarding the finitude of natural resources had touched upon depletion of 
oil before, it wasn’t until in late December 2000 that the expression peak oil was coin. The term 
was conceived as part of the naming process of the newly founded association ASPO (The 
Association for the Study of Peak Oil) by petroleum geologist Colin Campbell and energy physicist Kjell 
Aleklett (Aleklett 2012). ASPO can (according to cofounder Aleklett 2012) be said to have launched 
the modern discourse of peak oil and introduced it to the academic field during the past decade 
and a half.  
Though the actual term peak oil might have originated from the turn of the millennia, the theory 
itself was formalized by Shell employee and geologist M. King Hubbert in the 1950s. In short 
Hubbert constructed a statistical model over the rate of oil discoveries over time. Hubbert assumed 
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(from surveys done on oil discoveries in US lower 481, that showed discoveries to have peaked in 
the 1930s) that during a regions early exploitation of oil, findings would present themselves at an 
ever increasing rate, to finally reach its peak when half the reservoirs had been found. A point after 
which the rate of discovery would decline in an inverted symmetrical fashion, creating a bell shaped 
curve. Hubbard proceeded in modeling the behavior of an oil well during its various production 
stages, and assumed that the production rate of a well would take the same bell shape as that of oil 
discoveries, and that it would be possible to combine the assumed production curves of all wells 
in a region to extrapolate the peak of production for the region as a whole (ibid). Using his model 
and the statistical data available in the mid-1950s Hubbert predicted the peak oil of US lower 48 to 
occur sometime in between 1965 and 1971. Looking back and 1971 is indeed the year where US 
lower 48 oil production was at its highest (ibid). As a consequence Hubbert and his model received 
much international acclaim, and he and his bell shaped curve is still at the heart of the peak oil 
discourse as it is formulated today.  
Peak oil perceived as a discourse obviously transcends the mere notion of a global production peak 
of oil and the mathematical models used to examine and predict this peak in time – be they models 
derived from geophysics, statistics or economics. As a discourse peak oil is rather understood as 
the totality of theories and practices regarding such a peak in production. A discourse with 
aforementioned models of prediction included, but also including social, economic and political 
theories of impact as well as grass-root movements and the discourse as presented in media. Such 
theories of impact range from apocalyptic imageries regarding oil wars and a collapse of the global 
economic system, to more moderate theories of impact with energy preservation and gradual 
adaption to oil scarcity at the center of analysis. Below follows a brief presentation of how 
discourses will be perceived and conceptualized within the thesis.  
3. Discourse and dialectics 
”Outside a frame of references composed of defined terms and theory there is no scientific data, only 
chaos”2 – Gunnar Myrdal (1971) 
Discourse in this thesis will be understood in its expanded sense developed by Chantal Mouffe and 
Ernesto Laclau (Kolankiewicz 2012, Laclau 2010). In this tradition discourse is not understood (as 
often is within discourse theory) as being merely lingual. Discourse is not limited to any 
combination of speech and writing. Language, the traditional foundation of discourse theory, 
should rather be understood as only one instance of the social, and thus only “one of the possible 
ways for meaning to be articulated and for discourse to be disclosed” (Kolankiewicz 2012:127). 
Instead discourse should be understood as the totality of practices that comprise any societal 
formation/configuration. Discourse understood as such leaves no object and no practice as being 
non-discursive. Reality manifests itself only through discourse, and everything is discursively 
embedded. Mouffe and Laclau (Kolankiewicz 2012) make certain to point out that this is no anti-
material ontology; they acknowledge the existence of materiality, but claim that no object can be 
stripped of its discursive meaning. Objects will never present themselves to us as mere existential 
entities, but will always have discourse – line of thoughts, associations, preconceptions, prejudices 
                                                 
1 The 48 states south of Canada 
2 Authors translation 
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– imbedded into them. This means that there is no meaning to draw a distinction between discourse 
and non-discourse, since the only way to reach reality is through discourse (ibid).  
The above understanding opens up a multitude of entry points for fruitful analysis of discourse. 
Text and language is not the primary of discourse theory for Mouffe and Lanclau, in contrast to 
how discourse theory is traditionally conducted. Instead “every action, practice, ritual and 
institution is meaningful, everything social can be subject to discourse analysis” (Kolankiewicz 
2012: 128). In practice this means that discourse theory can be combined with a multitude of 
qualitative methods, and a wide range of empirics. As such discourse theory would appropriately 
be labeled ontology, a theory of how reality is comprised, and possibly an epistemology, a theory 
of how reality can be accessed by the researcher. Or put otherwise, a specific mode of thinking 
when it comes to reading gathered material collected for analysis.  
3.2 Dialectics 
Dialectics understood by Carchedi (2008) rests on three different principles; 1) ‘that social 
phenomena are always both realized and potential’; 2) ‘that social phenomena are always both 
determinant and determined’, and; 3) ‘that social phenomena are subject to constant movement 
and change’ (ibid). The first principle simply means that reality has, using Charchedis (2008) term, 
a ‘double dimension’; that which already is realized, and that which is only potentially existent. The 
concept of potential existence is intuitively evident, objects around us are what they are, but could 
be something different. Carchedi (ibid) argues that the same holds true for abstract social 
phenomena. The Swedish state is what it is, but could be realized into something different. A 
commodity bares a distinct value at the realization of its production (the abstract of labor consumed 
during its production), a value that might or might not be realized when it is sold (depending on 
how useful the customer finds the commodity). Even tendencies have their potential phenomena 
imbedded: “the rise (counter-tendency) is potentially present in the fall (the tendency) when the 
latter becomes realized and the fall (the tendency) is potentially present in the rise (the counter-
tendency) when the latter becomes realized” (Carchedi 2008:497). Thus what is activated can only 
be what is already potentially present in a phenomenon. 
The second principle, that ‘social phenomena are always both determinant and determined’ can 
simply be understood as how the relationships in between different phenomena work, and the logic 
through which phenomena are being called into existence. Intuitively we can deduct that all parts 
of social reality are interconnected, that one phenomenon leads to or reproduces another. And that 
our social reality as a whole constantly changes over time. Society irrefutably is ever evolving (or 
devolving). Dialectical determination is the ordering or conceptual structuring of this movement. 
Carchedi (ibid) distinguishes between determinants (the already existing) that spawn the determined 
(the reproduced) phenomena. The determined ones are already present as potentials in the 
determinant phenomena, and as such they call into existence their own conditions of reproduction. 
Or as Carchedi puts it; “[a] relation of mutual determination, or dialectical relation, is one in which the 
determinant phenomenon calls into realized existence the determined one from within its own potentialities. The 
determined phenomenon, in its turn, becomes the realized condition of the determinant phenomenon’s reproduction or 
supersession” (Carchedi 2008:499). Carchedi (ibid) offers an example; with the accumulation of 
capital the capitalistic system with its distinct mode of production was developed, and with the 
capitalistic mode of production capital accumulation was developed. One could also consider how 
new professions, relations or material things in and by themselves reproduce the utilization or need 
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of the same3. And further, every “phenomenon is an element of society and is thus connected 
directly or indirectly to all other phenomena, each phenomenon is the condition of existence 
and/or reproduction and/or supersession of all other phenomena” (Carchedi 2008:500). 
The third principle; that ‘social phenomena are subject to constant movement and change’ is a 
natural consequence of the first two principles. Movement and change are understood as the 
reproduction of potential phenomena from already realized phenomena, and vice versa (Carchedi 
2008). This movement is not chaotic but follows specific social and historical laws. For Carchedi 
(ibid) those laws under our current capitalist system would be the modes of production and the 
force of social laws in our socio-economic system – the inherent laws of capitalism if you will. For 
instance “the wealth produced in any society must be distributed for that society to reproduce itself. 
Under capitalism wealth is produced as value and thus surplus value in the form of money. The 
distribution of wealth is thus the distribution of Labour’s product between Labour and Capital, as 
wages and profits. Due to their importance, the laws of movement set the framework within which 
other (non-essential) phenomena are subject to change” (Carchedi 2008:504). 
So what does this give? The complex relation and the bindings between social phenomena gives 
that the social structure is dynamic rather than static. In fact, the relationships between phenomena, 
between realizations of the potential, also show society’s movement. It also becomes apparent that 
movement equals structure and that any contraposition between structure and movement is purely 
artificial. It is the dialectal structure that cause, even is, movement. Or put differently; “relation 
shows also society’s movement, the change undergone by realized social phenomena due to the 
realization of their potentialities and thus both the reproduction and the supersession of society as 
a whole” (ibid:513).  
Carchedi (2008) further claims that the reproduction is not equilibrium. Dialectal reproduction is 
not a cyclic process, but rather a process that strives for supersession (ibid). Reproduction in a 
dialectal sense is not merely a status-quo, but rather the counter tendency to the tendency of 
supersession. Economic theory centered on equilibriums can only explain reproduction, being 
‘constitutionally blind’ to capitalism’s supersession. This is according to Carchedi (2008) the 
fundamental critique of ‘bourgeois economic theory’. It would thus become apparent that the task 
of a researcher of social sciences is to study the reproductive phenomena in society, interpret them 
based on the laws of movement to which they’re bound, and if the researcher has a constructive 
streak; to identify where and under what circumstances mere reproduction processes can and has 
elevated and lead to supersession.  
3.3 The synthesis 
Trying to combine Mouffe’s and Laclau’s understanding of discourse and Carchedi’s understanding 
of dialectics will give us a fruitful theoretical frame for handling the empirical material and to 
understand the captured instances of reality that any material or set of data are an expression of. 
As well as enabling us to understand the motion in between these ‘snapshots’, and possibly even 
make a certain amount of extrapolation possible. Discourse should in this thesis be understood as 
all the practices, objects and expressions of and surrounding a (or several, at various abstraction 
levels) social phenomenon – as it is, in all of its totality. Discourse is what gives meaning to the 
                                                 
3 With the invention of the computer, computer innovators became needed for instance. 
8 
 
chaotic and contradictory status and entwinement of any series of practices and lines of thoughts 
comprising what can mundanely be called social processes, and dialectics is the force, or set of law-
like principles that propels and explains change within, both the singular and every set of, 
discourses. This understanding of discourse enables us to look at and analyze, and provide a 
method for handling the static and immovable sets of data that comprise most of what we call 
empirics. And this understanding of dialectics gives us a theoretical framework with which we can 
analyze and understand change within the discourses themselves. 
This thesis will mainly focus on theory and thought development using a limited set of academic 
texts to illustrate the progress of our discourse of interest – peak oil. Our methodological 
framework makes analysis possible using much wider and more varied material than can be found 
within the scope of this thesis however. This is intentional and done for two reasons. Firstly 
because as dialectics give, there are no closed processes and research must be conducted in such a 
manner as to accept this openness of the system; to ‘finish without end’ and make further advances 
possible. In following that line of thought there is a point in creating bigger shoes for yourself than 
what is strictly needed, to keep the system open and to further enable continued research on the 
matters dealt within. Secondly there is always a point in exploring and building upon one’s 
ontology. Every academic endeavor contains the opportunity of expanding the scope of the 
researcher’s own understanding of reality, to open up doors and make visible what was previously 
hidden. Methodological constructs will always be a reflection of one’s ontology, and as such there 
is a certain allure in developing a framework on a higher abstraction level and capable of dealing 
with more than what is strictly needed in order to handle the data at hand.  
More specifically this thesis will analyze and discuss a rather narrow material. The discussion on 
post politics in the first part (chapter 4) of the thesis will build upon a tradition that can be traced 
to Jaques Rancière (2005, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c etcetera) and is in much a theory building endeavor 
without much empirics. It will implicitly relay on the empiric material of the named theorists. The 
second part (chapter 5) will also be theory developing for most part, but will use a sample of 
academic peer-reviewed articles listed in a database of nearly two hundred articles on ASPOs web 
site. Since ASPO is an academic hub for ‘peak oil-ists’, and since only a handful of the article 
authors (to this author’s knowledge) are directly connected to ASPO (ASPO does not host the 
articles themselves, nor do they retain any copyrights; but provide links to publishers and journals) 
it is this authors hope that the cross-section of articles found in the database is a relatively 
representative cut of ‘peak oil-ists’ within academia and their take on the peak oil discourse over 
the decades.  
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4. The postpolitical condition 
“Postdemocracy is the government practice and conceptual legitimating of a democracy after the demos, 
a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount and dispute of the people and is thereby 
reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests…. 
It is the practice and theory of what is appropriate with no gap left between the forms of the state and 
the state of social relations” – Jaques Rancière4 
“People often say that, in a democracy, decisions are made by a majority of the people. Of course, that 
is not true. Decisions are made by a majority of those who make themselves heard and who vote - a 
very different thing” – Walter Henry Judd5 
With the fall of the Soviet union in 1991 voices were raised to affirm – what had already been 
proposed a decade earlier with the introduction of the postmodern discourse by Jean-Francois 
Lyotard – that we now live in the end of history. The world has embraced liberal democracy, and 
no further clashes between ideological ideas would ever arise again (Fukuyama 1992). Now it was 
time to reinvent politics. To move away from the antagonism of the previous grand stories 
(communism, liberalism, fascism etcetera) and let politics enter the realm of post-modernity, to 
adapt to a post-ideological world. In the following chapter an attempt to reconcile and formulate 
a common for the basis of contemporary post-democratic thought in the tradition of Jacque 
Rancière (2005, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c), Slavoj Žižek (2009, 2010), Chantal Mouffe (2008) etcetera, 
will be made. It is a necessary theoretical deep-dive, in order to understand the premises of post-
political thought that will construct the backbone in the analysis of the proposed recent change in 
the peak oil discourse. The chapter will be structured thematically while still giving some historical 
account and understanding to the dialectal processes at work. It will start with presenting the idea 
of the end of ideology, followed up with the proposed change of aim for politics in a non-
ideological world order (illustrated by Mouffe’s (2005) reading of Beck and Giddens managerial 
society).  
Secondly it will address a line of thought and give examples of a perceived issue of democratic 
excesses manifested in modern society. Excesses attributed as a grave danger to the ‘good rule’ 
(Rancière 2005, 2010a). This is a line of thought that has popularized and fueled what many (of the 
aforementioned theorists) have perceived to be highly anti-democratic and post-political practices 
and social theories. Finally a different understanding of democracy will be offered, an 
understanding that further explains the notion of recent decade’s post-political and post-
democratic developments, practices and ideals, and the critique thereof. 
Since Fukuyama a number of thinkers have tried to conceptualize the nature of the post-ideological 
world – a world where collective identities have “become hopelessly outdated, owing to the growth 
of individualism and [the need for those identities] to be relinquished” (Mouffe 2005:35). German 
sociologist Ulrich Beck claims that we live in a time where we are highly conscious of the flaws of 
our societal system. We live in a society where the old industrial ideals regarding infinite resources 
and infinite technological and economic progress is no longer being taken for granted, or that the 
                                                 
4 Rancière 1999:102 
5 Saying attributed to the republican politician and orator Walter Henry Judd (1898-1994) 
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processes to achieve progress at least are not without risk. And these risks are better addressed at 
an individual level than by using the ‘old ideological crouches’ of the past (ibid:38). 
Historically traditional values like class and gender struggles (that needed collective mobilization) 
was what propelled society forward. But according to Beck these values are outdated and the need 
for such mobilization is no longer there. It is no longer the instrumental rationality (the rationality 
of our institutions – our political parties, our unions or other collective identifiers and 
manifestations) that determines social history and dictate social change. The fundamental conflicts 
today are ”no longer of a distributional nature, about income, jobs, welfare benefits, but are 
conflicts over ’distributive responsibility’, i.e. how to prevent and control the risks accompanying 
the production of goods and the treats entailed by the advances of modernization” (Mouffe 
2005:37).  
Politics according to Beck (Mouffe 2005:39) should obviously adapt to this new reality of risk 
management and the obsolete constructs of collective identities. The main issues of concern to 
man in modern society cannot be captured by traditional subjects of politics like parties or unions. 
Instead we see an increase of NGOs and grass-root movements, disengaged from party politics, 
addressing issues and topics that were previously considered apolitical. What used to be political; 
wages, conditions at the work place, social security issues etc. are no longer considered to be 
political, and what used to be apolitical is now political. This shift of politics Beck (ibid) calls 
substitute politics – a process where “politics” is individualized and made able to free itself from 
its institutional shackles. A process Beck’s colleague Anthony Giddens (Brännström 2010) would 
say marks the shift from ‘emancipatory politics’ to ‘life style politics’. 
Beck (Mouffe 2005) means that to meet the challenges of a modern and knowledge based society, 
where no individual or group can posses’ insight of all aspects of an issue, politics must expand 
and reinvent itself. The conventional institutional rationality must be overthrown in favor of a more 
stratified understanding of politics. Experts, politicians, common man, businesses and the industry 
must (and are) all take part in reshaping the political and help manage the risks is society. The goal 
for politics is to open up a range of conventional and unconventional forums where a wide array 
of topics can be discussed and agreements reached via consensus. A prime example according to 
Beck (ibid) is the environmental threats looming at the horizon – threats that needs to be managed 
in and by all levels of society; research and information by experts; recycling and sustainable 
consumer patterns for individuals; environmental regulations by the state; sustainable practices by 
businesses and industry etcetera. 
This transition from conventional antagonistic and institutionalized politics to risk management in 
a risk society has by necessity blurred the boundaries between the private and the public spheres. 
The polemic condition between the political right and left, or the division of class and gender and 
other antagonisms cannot properly identify or manage the risks our society face. Truths cannot be 
found in the isolation of ideological standpoints but can only, according to Beck (ibid), be found 
and managed by dissuading antagonistic standpoints and reach consensus between a diversity of 
parties. All parties must realize the inadequacy of their knowledge and take a stance of general 
skepticism. In a society where skepticism has been generalized conflict will be pacified, and we will 
realize the need to work together and in accord, and realize that reaching consensus is the ultimate 
goal of politics (Mouffe 2005, Brännström 2010). 
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This view on politics as a joint and collaborative process, in part disengaged and in part meshed 
with the traditional institutionalized pathways of politics has proven very fruitful. Politics regarded 
as being in equal part highly individualized as it is promoted to cover a much wider range of 
interests than traditional politics – and the notion of the goal of politics being reaching consensual 
decisions via a managerial approach has been said (see Harvey 1989, 2010) to have had deep 
implications for both governing and governance. The emergence and popularization of so called 
public-private partnership, where city planning becomes the domain for consensual practices in 
between the public and private sector (Harvey 1989), is one example of this transition. The framing 
of environmental issues another (that will be addressed at length in the coming). Before addressing 
the implication of the consensual approach to politics we will take a brief look at another, seemingly 
detached – but as we will see highly entangled, effect of the supposed end to history by the 
reconciliation of ideology into liberal democracy as the only and the everlasting ‘grand story’.  
4.2 Hatred of democracy 
In 1975 the report ‘The cricis of Democracy: Report on the governability of democracies to the trilateral commission’ 
(Crozier, Michel, Huntington Samuel P, Watanuki Joji, 1975 New York University Press)6 was 
published at the request of a trilateral commission of politicians, experts and businessmen from 
the US, Japan and western Europe. The report suggested that democracy was in crisis. The reason 
was said to be ever increasing demands on the governments by their populace. Demands that were 
said to lead to the abolishment of all authority and had made individuals and groups opposed to 
discipline and unwilling to face up to the sacrifices required for society to function (Rancière 2005). 
French philosopher Jaques Rancière saw this as the beginning to the end of totalitarianism and 
dictatorships being the main threats to democracy. Now it was the very manifestations of the 
democratic society – democratic life – that was perceived as the biggest threat (ibid, Rancière 
2010b). 
These ‘threats’ to democracy were apparent in both Europe and the US in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, with constant and active opposition and questioning of authority, elitism and pragmatism. 
The cure proposed against this abundance of (and therefore threat against) democracy was a shift 
in attitude and a focus towards completely different goals. Instead of communal activism, private 
happiness, social relations and material wealth would be the ideals of democratic life (Rancière 
2005). In time it got apparent that this solution had a back side to it. By diminishing political fervor 
and steer the individual away from collectivism and into individualism demands on the government 
increased rather than decreased – though the aim of the demands were obviously different. Citizens 
became indifferent to the common good, and the governments became drained on authority (ibid). 
Democratic life could either mean a vital and strong activism and partaking in the public debate – 
which was bad; or it could mean political indifference and a focus on individual and material 
happiness – which was also bad. The excesses of democracy – on the one hand excessive activism, 
and on the other excessive consumerism had become the real enemy. Good governance thus 
became a matter of suppressing the excesses of democracy (Rancière 2005). According to Rancière 
(ibid) this analysis can only sustain itself on the basis of a threefold operation. By reducing 
democracy to a form of society and; by identifying society as spawned from the egalitarian 
individual rule and call everything from consumerism to activism into the object of society and 
                                                 
6 Rancière 2005:14 
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lastly; to hold the democratic and individual society accountable for the inherent logic of eternal 
growth heralded by capitalism. Only by this reduction of the political, the sociological and the 
economic to a single dimension and entity – can the ‘progress’ and manifestations of society be 
explained on the basis of a singular phenomenon; democracy (ibid).  
Such an operation is intuitively hard to acknowledge, we rarely translate democracy to the totality 
of public and private life and society as a whole. However this operation of equating democracy 
with the excesses of society is according to Rancière (2005) a vital and active process both in 
academia and practice, and has been since the 1970s. As we will see and based on the understanding 
of politics and democracy that this thesis will develop such an operation (equating democracy with 
society and ‘blame’ democracy for any societal excesses) and the analysis that follows (the 
overarching need to quell the excesses of democracy, in order to protect and legitimize democracy) 
is impossible. That said, the contempt for the ‘excesses of democracy’ is very much alive, and big 
efforts are being made to tame and control these excesses. 
4.3 The excesses of democracy  
Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek (2010) noted that in 2007 the people of the Czech Republic 
voiced concerns and raised demands for a public vote on the US plans to install radar equipment 
on Czech soil. Over 70 percent of the Czech populace was opposed to the plans. Yet the Czech 
government, denying its citizen a public vote, went forward with their plans and allowed the US to 
build their radars. The official stance was that matters of such importance should be left to experts 
and not to the whims of the masses. A stance that begs to consider the contents of democracy and 
what issues should be dealt with by experts alone. Should questions of economics be left to 
economists, issues of power be left to the strong – and then; what is left to vote on (Žižek 2010)? 
A year later, in 2008, Ireland voted against the treaty of Lisbon in a public vote. Ireland was the 
only country in the EU that actually held a public vote, and the only reason this was allowed was 
due to some ‘oddities’ in their constitution that gave right to a public vote (Ross 2010). The treaty 
was an updated version of a previous treaty that had been voted down in public votes in both 
France and the Netherlands. The treaty itself had according to its cowriter Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
merely been updated cosmetically (ibid), and this time around all countries besides Ireland would 
be represented by their representatives – and no public votes be held. Once it was clear that the 
Irish population had turned the treaty down the uproar and indignation among politicians and press 
alike in Europe was a fact. The French foreign minister said it to be extremely embarrassing for 
the Irish population. The speaker of the European parliament said that it was a big disappointment 
that the Irish were not prepared to do what was necessary to secure further democratization of 
Europe, and Nicolas Sarkozy called for an immediate re-vote (ibid). 
These are but a few examples of governmental and popular practices to control and suppress what 
Rancière (2005, 2010a, 2010c) would call ‘the excesses of democracy’. Several other instances of 
oppression or ‘failure’ to adhere to public opinion have played out this recent decade. One instance 
would be the public vote on Swedish nuclear power in 1980 that resulted in the decision of total 
dismantlement in 2010 (a process that has been postponed, without debate, onto the future) or 
what many theorists (Holmström 2012) and opinion makers (see Lundgren & Danielsson 2012 and 
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Zetterström 2001) would call Sweden’s silent entry (by cooperation rather than formal entry) into 
NATO via PPF and EAPR7 and via joint combat exercises in recent years.  
These practices to control and subdue the effects of democratic life, in the name of democracy, 
can according to Rancière (2005) only make sense in the aforementioned process of attributing to 
democracy all social and economic processes spawned from capitalism, by defining democracy not 
only as the rule of law and practices of representative governing, but also the totality of social life 
as reproduced under our economistic paradigm. A statement that begs to question what alternative 
view of democracy and politics we have at our disposal. 
4.4 Democracy – the empty signifier 
Democracy as a concept stands unchallenged in the western hemisphere and all but very few would 
address themselves as democrats, but there is also very few that have a clear and specific answer as 
to what democracy really is. Wendy Brown (2010) puts it eloquently, and I paraphrase; ‘Berlusconi 
and Bush, Derrida and Balibar, Italian communists and Hamas; we’re all democrats!’. Giorgio 
Agamben (2010) means that the popular understanding of democracy is the constitutional 
formation of the political body on the one hand, and a way to govern on the other; the right to rule 
and the way to exercise that rule in practice. This inevitably means that democracy has two 
dimensions, a judicial-political, and an economic-managerial; and to understand and grasp 
democracy is to understand these two dimensions. Alain Badiou (2010) acknowledges the same 
thought but further claims democracy to be but an emblem behind which an ordering of power 
‘hides’. Democracy is but the legitimation and upholding of static power formations in order to 
secure the reproduction of our capitalistic system – for the benefit of the few, and the demise of 
many.   
Wendy Brown (2010) goes even further and claim democracy to be an empty signifier; something 
to which each and every one can tie their dreams and wishes. The democratic term is hollow and 
without meaning – or conversely holds an all-encompassing meaning for everything that is good, 
without discrimination. She further proposes democracy in the grasp of capitalism to have been 
reduced to a brand. A brand among other brands (think Starbucks or Apple) that promote 
‘meaning’ rather than contents to goods, in our modern consumerist society. Jean-Luc Nancy 
(2010) agrees and claims democracy to mean everything – politics, aesthetics, justice, law and 
civilization. By equating democracy with the good rule democracy has effectively erased any 
possibility of raising questions or critique, or to oppose. What is left over is merely a few 
marginalized questions regarding different democratic systems and attitudes. 
Similar arguments regarding the hollow and meaningless object of democracy has been raised by a 
multitude of theorists (see above, but also Žižek 2010, Bensaid 2010, Dikec 2005 among others) 
and how this hollowness masks or assimilates and thus equates democracy to neoliberalism and its 
practices; a far reach from the original meaning of the word democracy as the rule of the ‘demos’. 
In this tradition the representative system and voting procedures are, and have always been, merely 
                                                 
7 PFF stands for Partnership for Peace, a partnership program between NATO and non NATO states for joint military 
peace operations around the world. EAPR is the political framework for a Euro-Atlantic partnership program on issues 
of security and intelligence between NATO and 22 non NATO states. The program also includes issues of a more 
general nature, where cooperation and common policy is of value to the members (Regeringen: 
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2561). 
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a way to legitimize and reproduce what is in fact oligarchy rather than democracy. Pierre 
Rosanvallon (2010) provides multiple examples of practices (in changing voting procedures, in 
reshaping qualifications for the representatives etc) ranging from the French revolution up until 
today where for instance parliamentarism, one of the emblems of democracy, has served the 
purpose of controlling and acting as the opposing power against democracy; with the aim of 
realizing an elected and thus legitimized aristocracy. If democracy as popularly understood is the 
empty significant of Brown (2010), and if it serves no other purpose than to legitimize and/or hide 
the universalization and enable uninterrupted reproduction of an economic system (capitalism), 
then what place does democracy have in theory and practice? Rancière offers an alternative 
understanding of democracy that might show us a way forward.    
4.5 Dissent as politics proper 
Rancière (2005, 2010a) suggests looking backwards and consulting Plato’s Republic. According to 
Plato there are a number of natural hierarchies in society that rests on pre-given and natural 
foundations; authority based on seniority (gerontocracy), knowledge (plutocracy or technocracy) 
or power (oligarchy) etcetera, and then there is democracy – where the ground for the power of 
ruling rests on; nothing! (ibid). What Rancière (2005, 2010a) means is that in democracy, interpreted 
as the rule of the people (demos; people, -cracy; rule), there is no naturally given (or divine or 
elsewhere grounded) authority distinguishing the rule from the ruled. In every system (and in the 
realities of our own society) there are objective differences and forms of power operating in society; 
theoretical principles governing the distributions of power, position and capacity. Governments 
and the rule of law are institutions formulating these principles and formalizing the position and 
capacity of power. Democracy on the other hand gives power to those without any claim to power; 
power without seniority or wealth or strength or other qualifications that involve a clear distribution 
of positions – but instead by qualification without qualification. Qualification based on nothing 
else than an egalitarian presumption. As such Rancière(2005, 2010a-c) means that democracy can 
never equate a system of governing. 
“Democracy means precisely that the ‘power of the demos’ is the power of those that 
no arkhèentitled them to exercise. Democracy is not a definite set of institutions, nor 
is it the power of a specific group. It is a supplementary, or grounding, power that at 
once legitimizes and de-legitimizes every set of institutions or the power of any one 
set of people” 8Rancière 2010a:52 
Rancière (2010b) claims (like Rosanvallon 2010) that democracy as a term was invented by its own 
enemies; those in position to rule by virtue of class, wealth, age or knowledge – enemies mockingly 
calling upon democracy as the rule of those without authority to do so. It is therefore a fatal mistake 
equating democracy with representative system of governing or any arbitrary construct of state 
mechanisms and institutions. The logic of the state is in fact the very arkhè that democracy 
challenges. In a parliamentary system (or any other system of division of authority) hierarchies of 
power is formalized and reproduced, while democracy opposes formalization and systematization 
of power (Rancière 2005). Democracy should instead be understood as processes enabling this very 
                                                 
8 Arché is for Rancière the pillars of naturally given authority that gives rise to power distribution; wealth, knowledge, 
age etc. Or in other words; the logic by which power is distributed. 
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rupture between the ordered and the chaotic; the challenge of those who stand on the sidelines and 
those who’s standing has already been ordered by the arkhé. 
Politics thus become the anarchist act of breaking the logic of predetermined power relations. To 
‘give voice to what was previously heard only as noise’. To count those who were uncounted. As 
such politics for Rancière (2005, 2010a-c) always take form as dissent (the opposite of consensus), 
an act of opposition rather than of negotiation. The negotiation of power is something that takes 
place within the logic of archè, and is as such apolitical. The mechanism of state interplay and the 
processes of governing belong to those that already are in power, and only by introducing the 
anarchistic rupture of making heard those on the outside of the inherent logic of the system, is 
politics made and democracy realized. 
Then how does this rupture look? How is politics realized? Rancière (2005) sees the conflict 
between the logic of the archè and the demos as being the battle between two spheres, the private 
and the public. The public sphere is the arena in which the logics of democracy and egalitarian 
values meet the conflicting logic and manifestation of archè in polemic struggle. A struggle in which 
the naturally strong constantly try to privatize the public sphere in a process Rancière calls public 
privatization. By conquering and privatizing the public sphere the area where politics can reign 
grow smaller, and the possibilities of opposing the logic of the arché diminishes. In practice this 
process is realized when governments internalizes issues and make matters ‘into their own’, into 
questions of internal management instead of public concern (ibid). Democracy then becomes about 
conquering/reconquering9 and questioning government’s ‘privatization’ of matters that could 
equally well be matters of public strife; to extend the reaches of the public sphere and introduce 
new fields for polemic struggle against the structured order of things. 
Mustafa Dikec explores the apparent spatiality of Rancières take on politics. In order to analyze 
this dimension, that for him seems to be a core constituent of Rancières thought, Dikec defines 
space as “neither naturally given nor immutable, but rather […] a product of interrelations always 
in the making, and never ‘a totally coherent and interrelated system of interconnections’, and, thus, 
is both disrupted and a source of disruption” (Dikec 2005:180). Given the mobility and instability 
of space, the space of politics can never be equal to the static organization of political parties and 
institutions. Instead politics is made possible by the individuals and groups transgressing the fixed 
structure and logic of organized society to “constitute themselves spatially, open new discursive 
spaces of political debate, transform the (proper) space of circulation into a space of parade, or 
transform the (proper) space of work into a space in which a political capacity can be demonstrated, 
rather than simply succeeding into pregiven structures when the Time comes” (Dicek 2003:181)  
4.6 Agonistic politics 
One of the main issues with politics proper understood in a strict Rancièrian sense is that the 
phenomena becomes far from a strict process of action. In fact, an act or process of politics proper 
could be interpreted as so elusive and distant from the ruling regime that it risk losing contents. 
Rancière can for instance only provide us with a handful of examples throughout modern history 
                                                 
9 Consider matters of wages, racial and sexual rights, voting rights for women etc. These are all issues that were at one 
time considered to be apolitical. They belonged to the private sphere. But via polemic movements (the mobilization 
of the workers, Rosa Parks manifestation and the consecutive black movement, etc) these are issues that has been 
(temporarily in some cases) conquered and placed in the private sphere, open for political strife.   
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of political acts (the Paris commune, women voting rights and a few others). As such the term 
becomes problematic. Claiming that the majority of fighting for workers’ rights on the barricades 
in the streets and in union offices and parliament during the 60s and 70s was apolitical would not 
only be provocative to a whole generation of politically active individuals and collectives. It would 
also risk rendering the political act so rare and random that the term loses relevance. 
Drawing on the underlying understanding of democracy as a rupture with hegemony and a conflict 
between different logics Chantal Mouffe (2008) introduces what she calls the ‘agonistic’ approach; 
a constructive frame for dealing with and promoting politics. Mouffe (ibid) means that the ultimate 
task of democracy doctrines is to figure out how the antagonistic dimension of politics, the core 
constituent of politics proper, can be given outlets that does not destroy the political cohesiveness. 
Instead of reaching consensus via the negotiation of interest on perceived neutral ground (politics 
according to Beck and Giddens as discussed above) politics should be seen as the strife-laden 
relationship between legitimate enemies. The legitimacy of this enemy relationship is what to Mouffe 
(ibid) differentiates politics of antagonism and agonism. While antagonism is disruptive and strives 
for delegitimize the opposing part; be it via a violent and militarized revolution from the left, or via 
capital outmaneuvering and solidification of hegemony and the death of politics proper by the 
right. Agonism on the other hand strives for the construction of a playing field where the 
antagonistic dimension is allowed to play out; but under a common set of rules. A ‘consensual 
strife’ of sorts. The agonistic approach is radical, even revolutionary in the sense that it strives to 
overthrow hegemony, but it does not delegitimize the right of conflicting ideas to take part in the 
(sometimes violent) strife.  
Using our methodological frame of reference, it seems that the popularized understanding of 
democracy – the prevalent democratic discourse – attempts to close the dialectal movement of its 
own being; enabling reproduction (a reproduction of already given power formations within our 
‘oligarchy’), but prohibiting supersession and actual ‘progress’. As we’ve learned discourse does not 
acknowledge solid states, and dialectal movements are not processes that strive for equilibrium. It 
is therefore interesting to consider where democracy under suppressive pressure is heading; 
towards supersession or towards degradation.  
To many theorists (see above) of the post-political paradigm, efforts from states and governments 
seem to attempt to stabilize and find that impossible dialectal equilibrium. In the attempt to secure 
existing positions of power discourses are articulated in a way to preserve an imagined solid state 
for liberal democracy. But in so doing they risk a negative dialectical supersession into an apolitical 
and populist regime with a heavy dose of democratic contempt. For Rancière, in slight contrast, it 
seems that the lack of dialectical movement forms the natural state in society. The bursts of activity 
activating the dialectal chain of discourse reproduction elevated to discourse supersession are 
always chaotic and random and limited in its temporal scope. Power hierarchies are fixed and only 
moveable by ‘revolutionary’ activities. Mouffe (2005) offers a synthesis where the antagonistic 
necessity of politics proper is acknowledged, but where the constructive dead-end of politics-
realized under the thought of Rancière is circumvented. Mouffe (idib) gives us a way to be 
constructive regarding the realization of politics; a way to challenge hegemony and to realize 
supersession from our current state of existence; an existence that by the principles of dialectics 
has other potentials imbedded to be realized. 
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With this rather lengthy account for the nature of democracy, post politics and politics proper we 
shall now look to our discourse of interest; peak oil. In order to do so we will approach the peak 
oil discourse from a more general point of view, in considering the whole discourse on 
environmental change – and more particularly how environmental change is being framed under 
‘ecologies of fear’, and use that framing as a springboard to further analyze the peak oil discourse.  
5. Ecologies of fear and apocalyptic imageries  
In the following an attempt to examine how post political dogmas has infused the discourse of 
environmental change, and how ecologies of fear via apocalyptic imageries threaten to eliminate 
the possibility of disagreement and dissent that we’ve learned constitutes the possibility of politics 
proper. This field has been thoroughly examined by Eric Swyngedouw (2010) and his theories 
rather than self-claimed empirics will guide us through this process. 
Over the past decade or so we have seen an ever increasing concern and debate over environmental 
change in general (biodiversity, deforestation etc.) and of global warming in particular. What was 
first popularized by Margret Thatcher while running for Prime Minister in the UK, has since 
formed into a huge and massively influential discourse leaving no one uninformed. It is a discourse 
with strong apocalyptic imageries attached to it. Global climate change is increasingly staged as a 
looming danger to both ‘nature’ as such and as a threat to the very survival of our civilization. A 
danger that if not acted upon immediately, will inevitably lead to a time where it is too late. 
Politicians of various positions, environmental activists, business leaders and the scientific 
community alike have now formed a fragile consensus around the dangers of and the need to act 
against global environmental change. Swyngedouw (2010) argues that this move towards a 
consensual view on the nature of the problem and the need for managerial approaches to mitigate 
the issue, has unfolded in parallel and entanglement with the consolidation of the new neo-liberal 
and post-political dogma of evacuated dispute and disagreement from the public sphere (ibid 215). 
While as Swyngedouw (2010) points out there really is no consensus about what nature is and how 
to relate to it, there is a wide consensus over the need to act, think and be more ‘environmentally 
sustainable’. Large oil companies like BP (revealingly renamed from British Petroleum to Beyond 
Petroleum) and Shell brand themselves as eco-sensible. Politicians of all brands claim themselves 
to promote eco friendliness and both governments and media frequently usher the need for 
sustainable life styles and reforms. Swyngedouw (ibid) means that this consensual framing is in 
itself sustained by a particular scientific discourse where the relation between ‘matters of fact’ and 
‘matters of concern’ has been short-circuited. The changing atmospheric composition caused by 
increasing levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gases is a matter of fact – a fact that without proper 
political intermediation translates into matters of concern. While the matters of concern that arise 
from the matters of fact is of a political nature, that nature is disavowed and the concerns 
themselves elevated to fact. While the matters of concern are highly political, they have been de-
politized by a relegation to the terrain beyond dispute, to a space that forecloses dissensus or 
disagreement – to where “scientific expertise becomes the foundation and guarantee for properly 
constituted politics/policies” (Swyngedouw 2010:217). 
This consensual framing and short-circuit of the political dimension of environmental change is 
according to Swyngedouw (ibid) upheld and sustained by ‘ecologies of fear’; “[t]he discursive matrix 
through which the contemporary meaning of the environmental condition is woven is one quilted 
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systemically by the continuous invocation of fear and danger, the specter of ecological annihilation 
or at least seriously distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future” 
(Swyngedouw 2010:217). These ‘ecologies of fear’ are in turn sustained by apocalyptic imaginaries 
like a world in permanent war over resources; a world with everlasting water shortages, droughts, 
storms and floods; increased water levels to where whole nations are situated below water and a 
society thrown back to the stone age due to a collapse of the global economy; be it from resource 
scarcity and peak oil, or constant wars in a world out of synch.  
Swyngedouw (2010) argues that “sustaining and nurturing apocalyptic imaginaries is an integral and 
vital part of the new cultural politics of capitalism […] for which the management of fear is a central 
leitmotif” (Swyngedouw 2010:219) and that the management of fear is a powerful tool in 
“disavowing or displacing social conflict and antagonism” (ibid). As such apocalyptic imaginaries 
exhort a decisively populist framing without alternate trajectories around which politics proper can 
arise. It is a mobilization without a political subject. Instead the imaginaries call for techno-
managerial advances and socio-cultural transformations “organized within the horizons of a 
capitalist order that is beyond dispute” (ibid). In other words; radical change is called for, but only 
within the scope of our current system so that nothing really has to change. 
5.1 Populist maneuvers within environmental discourses 
Swyngedouw (2010) argues that environmental politics and the sustainability debate signal a range 
of populist maneuvers that ‘infuse the post-political condition’. He proceeds in summarizing the 
particular ways this populism is expressed. Firstly the issue of climate change is not merely 
perceived as global, but also as a universal threat. In so doing it cuts through any heterogeneity and 
forecloses ideological response and antagonism by distilling a common threat to all of nature and 
humanity; we’re all universal victims. Secondly, “this universalizing claim of the pending 
catastrophe is socially homogenizing” (Swyngedouw 2010:221), though apparent (geographical and 
social) differences exist within the apocalyptic scenario – we’re all in the same boat. Thirdly the 
apocalyptic thought related to climate change “reinforces the nature-society dichotomy and the 
causal power of nature to derail civilizations” (ibid 222). Stabilizing climate change is argued to be 
the only way to save our way of life within the capitalistic system. We need to reverse into an 
imagined state of equilibrium present in the past. The enemy is externalized and objectified, viewed 
as intruders in the system. The system itself is not at fault, but its pathological syndrome 
(greenhouse gasses, depletion of resources, immigrants’ etcetera). As such, the cure is internal. 
Remove the problem (remove excess CO2 from the atmosphere via commodification and carbon 
trade, find alternate sources of energy/resources) and return to a status quo and the problem will 
be solved and the system have survived (ibid). 
Fourth, “populism is based on a politics of ‘the people know best’ […], supported by a scientific 
technocracy assumed to be neutral” (Swyngedouw 2010:223). A good solution (if not the optimal) 
will be reached via a governing of stakeholder participation that “operates beyond the state and 
permits a form of self-management, self-organization and controlled self-disciplining” (ibid) all 
under the logics of the current and non-disputed liberal-capitalism. Fifth, “populist tactics do not 
identify a privileged subject of change […], but instead invoke a common condition […], the need 
for common humanity-wide action, mutual collaboration and cooperation” (Swyngedouw 
2010:223). The political subject is all-encompassing. Internal strife, heterogeneity and 
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disagreement, the necessity for politics proper to be called into being, is replaced by a 
homogenization of the political subject. 
Sixth, “populist demands are always addressed to the elites” (ibid). Change is never about replacing 
the elites, but to call upon them to take action. Populism as such is always non-partisan and 
apolitical in that it does not question the order of things, but rather calls upon the system to return 
to an imagined status quo when times were better. Seventh, “no proper names are assigned to a 
post-political populist politics”. The dimension of naming and counting that which was previously 
unnamed or uncounted, so central to the idea of creating political subjects in the thought of 
Rancière (2005, 2010a) is never present in populist politics. “Only ‘empty’ signifiers like ‘climate 
change policy’, ‘bio-diversity policy’, or a vacuous ‘sustainable policy’ replace the proper names of 
politics” (Swyngedouw 2010:224). In contrast to other signifiers that promise a ‘positive’ content 
for the future like communism, liberalism or socialism, politics of populism is only captured in its 
‘negative’ contents; no promise for a better tomorrow or a transcendence of the current. At best 
apocalyptic imaginaries promise a never ending managerial effort to return to a status quo. 
Finally populism in the shape of apocalyptic imaginaries “forecloses universalization as a positive 
socio-environmental injunction or project. […] [T]he environmental problem does not posit a 
positive and named socio-environmental situation, an embodied vision, a desire that awaits 
realization, a fiction to be realized. In that sense, populism does not solve problems, it moves them 
elsewhere” (Swyngedouw 2010:224). Consider how nuclear power is once again portrayed as a 
possible future solution to greenhouse gas emissions and the depletion of oil, and branded a green 
alternative. The socio-natural construct of CO2 is replaced with another socio-natural object 
(U234/238) as the object of remedy for our current predicament.    
It should be clear that climate change discourses utilizing apocalyptic imaginaries foreclose the 
possibility of politics proper as discussed at length earlier in this thesis. In the following I will look 
closer on the peak oil discourse to see if it should be included in the part and parcel hegemony of 
populist post political discourses using apocalyptic imaginaries to exile the possibility of politics 
proper. Peak oil is often portrayed as the point of no return on the inevitable downfall of liberal 
capitalism, and is thus framed as a discourse to break hegemony. 
5.2 Oil as a matter of concern 
The peak oil discourse largely follows the same particular scientific discourse that the major eco-
discourses discussed by Swyngedouw (2010) does; directly translating ‘matters of fact’ into ‘matters 
of concern’, effectively short circuiting the political dimension of such a transformation by 
rendering ‘matters of concern’ into a terrain beyond dissent and disagreement. This process of 
political foreclosure can be implicitly read in the vast majority of the data at hand; where oil’s 
indisputable finitude is directly translated to scarcity and where the political and economic 
dimension of oil is being reduced to ‘laws of nature’ (a peak in production following a bell shaped 
curb towards inevitable decline). An overwhelming amount of research being done on peak oil is 
highly technical and simply models attempting to forecast the peak’s point in time, or temporal 
extensions made possible by new technologies etc. There is rarely a questioning of the core 
assumptions or laws governing ‘the peak and the curve’. A telling example is Heffington & 
Brasovan (1994) who state that since Hubbert first presented his theory “the effect on ultimate oil 
production quantity due to social, political, economic, and technological effects has not been well 
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addressed” (ibid:813). What follows is a four page analysis of US oil extraction growth patterns 
resulting in; one mathematical equation, a slightly skewed bell curve and a conclusion that says 
Hubbert was wrong, US will have a total of 5% higher oil production than what Hubbert predicted, 
before oil in the US is depleted (ibid). The social, political, economic and technological effects are 
implicitly regarded as captured by merely analyzing historical trends of actual production and 
extrapolating it onto the future using Hubberts bell curve. 
Other examples of similar accounts, making various geological and economic assumptions in order 
to accurately depict the bell curve (by including new data, new oil findings – including 
nonconventional oil, or more sophisticated mathematical models) are abundant (see for instance 
Hallock et al 1994, Brant 2007 and Castro et al 2009).  While this kind of research surely can give 
some insight into different production scenarios and be of help in forecasting oil well productions 
in certain areas, they are by their nature one-sidedly apolitical. To ‘peak oil-ists’ they represent the 
scientific technocracy, the neutral scientists that oftentimes never mention any societal effects or 
suggests any solutions to the ‘inevitable decline’. These are the ‘hard’ scientists to whom the ‘softer’ 
peak oil researchers turn when trying to map the socio-economic impacts on and off peak oil; 
again, without questioning the core fundaments of the theory. Logar et al. (2013) cites both Hallock 
et al (1994) and Castro et al (2009) when trying to analyze the future of tourism in Spain for 
instance. Hallock et all (1994) also acts as the basis for the article “Public Health and Medicine in 
an Age of Energy Scarcity” (Schwartz  et al. 2011). While both these articles might provide good 
insight into their respective sectors (tourism and health and medicine respectively), they are also 
symptomatic in their implicit and un-reflexive translation of ‘matter of fact’ in to ‘matter of 
concern’.  
Consulting Swyngedouw’s theories regarding ‘ecologies of fear’ as an instrument for the cultural 
politics of capitalism aimed at displacing and disavowing conflict and antagonism, this chapter will 
examine the particular ways in which populism is infused into the peak oil discourse. Important to 
keep in mind is that unlike global warming for instance, there is no broad and mobilized general 
consensus around peak oil. As such it is obviously more difficult to claim, like Swyngedouw (2010) 
does with respect to increased levels of CO2 in the atmosphere and the global warming discourse, 
that peak oil is being mobilized as an integral and important reproducing factor behind global 
capitalism (though as we will see it might very well turn out that way). Peak oil is at present a rather 
marginalized and disruptive discourse. What will be examined is rather the dangers that peak-oilists 
face when trying to mobilize peak oil as a natural end-point to capitalism; a potential or inevitable 
revolutionary force to break hegemony. In order to make this examination the next section will 
draw on the ways in which populism manifests itself in environmental discourse according to 
Swyngedouw (2010), as elaborated upon in the previous chapter. The data analyzed will consist of 
the previously mentioned database of peer-reviewed articles from ASPO. 
5.2.2 Populist maneuvers within peak oil 
The first infusion of populism into the eco-discourse Swyngedouw (2010) identifies is the extension 
of the issue beyond and above the global, labeling the problem as a universal threat; making the 
issue all-encompassing and cutting through any heterogeneity – a process foreclosing any 
ideological response. Peak oil surely present declining oil rates as such a universal threat to its 
theorists. The literature is riddled with doom and unstoppable apocalypse. Richard C. Duncan’s 
(1996) Olduvai theory would present a most illustrate example. The theory is widely cited within 
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peak oil circles and claims that our current global energy use will lead to an inevitable transition to 
a post-Industrial Stone Age, irrespective of measures taken. A more moderate (in apocalyptic 
terms) account is given by James Leigh (2008) who depicts peak oil to “facilitate civilization clash 
in a grab for the world's oil resources” (Leigh 2008:3) and for “nations [to possibly] weld together 
to forge continent-wide civilization superpowers” (ibid) waging war over the remains of oil (future 
peak oil wars and oil imperialism is a common motif in several papers; see Foster (2008) and Leigh 
(2011) for other such accounts).  
In a somewhat more spiritual account of the looming environmental disaster and peak oil Timothy 
Leduc (2008) suggests that “[w]hile liberal secularists may think the Christian apocalypse to be a 
misguided belief, scientiﬁc discourses on the potential interacting impacts of climatic changes and 
energy shortages oﬀ er an almost complementary rational depiction of apocalypse” (ibid:255). Right 
as he is, he never questions this apocalyptic framing, but rather insists that apocalyptic imaginaries 
holds the potential to infuse a secular form of ethics, enabling us to face up to the difficulties of a 
deteriorating climate. Though pressed on in various ways and to various degrees – for ‘peak oil-
ists’ the apocalypse is nigh and that the treat (preventable or not) is universal is certainly one of the 
leitmotifs in the peak oil discourse.  
The socially homogenizing element, Swyngedouw’s (2010) second denominator for populism, is 
also a very common denotative in the literature. Particularly differences in how peak oil will affect 
various geographical parts of the world is prominent (see Becken 2008 and Leigh 2008 etc.). It is 
however very rare that differences are discussed in terms of social classes and using other 
vocabularies accentuating social differences (globally or regionally). Differences are more 
commonly discussed in technocratic ways, in national or regional ‘peaks’ for instance (Höök et al. 
(2009) gives a classic comparative analysis of the Danish peak and how it connects to energy 
policies in Sweden and Norway). The topic of analysis rarely transgress the bounds of oil supply 
and demand. Where politics is infused in the analysis it is often via macro-scale geopolitical 
accounts. Leigh & Vucovic (2010) give a through account for the potential Iranian hegemony in 
oil producing Islamic countries and attempts to politicize oil via its geopolitical and strategic 
importance. They enter into some depth in analyzing political and religious trends and movements 
in their attempt to extrapolate potential new power configurations in the Middle East. For instance 
they reach the conclusion that “we could expect to see Shia power appear in an array of nations, 
to a significant level, of course giving Iran access to much political power, in and across these 
nations, through their proxies or vassals” (ibid:18) and for the Islamic world under peak oil “to 
confront the dominance of the Western Christian civilization in world economics and politics” 
(ibid:21). Intriguing as the analysis is, in the end it largely fuels the same apocalyptic imaginaries as 
has previously been presented, albeit with a twist. Instead of a pure man versus nature clash of 
apocalyptic proportions they usher for (western) homogenization against yet another threat; that 
of the clash of civilization; 
“Within a new world order, of a tripartite mix of continent-wide civilization 
superpowers, an Iran-led Sunni:Shia Islamist coalition, across large stretches of the 
Islamic world, with aggressive revolutionary and apocalyptic inspiration from Teheran, 
may be the launch pad for attempted far-reaching Islamist influence. This Islamist bloc, 
rich in oil, and therefore petropower, and awash in nuclear weapons, could usher in a 
host of dramatic world events and trends” Leigh & Vucovic (2010:31) 
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As much as the above might be perceived as an illumination and counting of interests exceeding 
the simplistic clash between man and nature and expanding the discourse to account for a wider 
multitude of parties, the framing is decidedly apocalyptical and exclusive while being homogenizing 
at the same. Rather than accounting for varying and diverse societal configurations the approach 
is distinctly ‘west centered’. It is an ‘us versus them’ approach that nonetheless seek 
homogenization against a common and universal threat. 
The third entry of populism into the eco-discourse that Swyngedouw (2010) identifies is the 
reinforcement of the nature-society dichotomy and the power of nature to derail civilization. While 
the close and entangled relationship of man and nature is indeed a central leitmotif for ‘peak oil-
ists’. Consider for instance Cutler’s (2003) call to listen to “the important feedbacks between the 
economy and the environment” (ibid:18) in order to “guide the development of sustainable 
economies” (ibid) in his aptly titled paper ‘Biophysical Constraints to Economic Growth’ (Cutler 
2003). And while voices within the discourse are raised for a sort of reversal to an imagined 
equilibrium (see for instance Hall & Klintgaard’s (2006) call for a biophysical-based paradigm shift 
in economics where the whole nature is proposed to be economized and prized in order to 
accentuate the man-nature relationship) peak oil does not assume a stance of trying to stabilizing 
the system in the same manner as Swyngedouw’s (2010) global warming activists and theorists. It 
might be due to the immaturity of the discourse and the fact that the discourse in many cases still 
resides in a purely apocalyptic state without excursions into managerial fixes and upholding of ‘our 
way of life within our current system’.  
However, though the discourse is showing signs of ‘maturing’ and developing a new more 
moderate register (see below), at large the discourse is highly critical of the current economic 
regime. Many peak oil theorists see the system rather than oil as the pathological syndrome. Lloyd 
(2007) for instance claims that reversal is impossible and that “peak oil seems to be falling into the 
‘no technical solution’ category” (ibid:5806) when it comes to salvaging Hardin’s classical 
‘commons’. So while the nature-society dichotomy and the power of nature to overthrow 
civilization is readily present in the discourse, the imagined equilibrium state of the past does not 
seem as alluring.  
The fourth syndrome of populism within the eco-discourse (Swyngedouw 2010) is the politics of 
‘the people knows best’ supported by a scientific neutral technocracy. I will briefly go out-of-
bounds and look beyond the scope of academia to address this issue. Peak oil is largely a grass-root 
movement, and one of a very diverse nature. Backed by contemporary authoritative academics like 
Campbell and Aleklett, and academic organizations such as ASPO10 and The Oil Drum11; and 
together with a wide array of parties such as: environmental movements (the Transition Network12 
for instance), de-growth movements (see Research & Degrowth13) and conferences (among others 
the conference on ‘Economic De-growth for Ecological Sustainability and Social 
Equity’14),politicians (Swedish green party member Per Bolund has motioned15 for Sweden to 
                                                 
10 Found on http://www.peakoil.net 
11 Found on http://www.theoildrum.com 
12 Found on http://www.transitionnetwork.org/ 
13 Found on http://www.degrowth.org/ 
14 Found on http://events.it-sudparis.eu/degrowthconference/en/ 
15 Motion 2013/14:N440 Biodrivmedelsindustri för att rusta Sverige mot oljeproduktionstoppen (peak oil) by Per Bolund (mp) 
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prepare for the coming of peak oil for instance) and other influential parties on the fringes 
(Sweden’s most read economic blogger Lars Wilderäng16 for one) and with survivalists movements 
and doomsday ‘preppers’ at the extreme end of the spectrum (see the National geographic 
channel’s reality show ‘Doomsday Preppers’ for an intriguing illustration) peak oil is indeed a very 
diverse discourse. The movements do vary in ‘elitism’ and ‘exclusivity’ (with the ‘doomsday 
preppers’ distrusting all but themselves and the de-growth movements trying to reach and embrace 
all), but to some extent they all mobilize collective identities that could be interpreted as a ‘the 
people knows best’ politics, and they all draw on an assumed neutral technocracy (represented by 
leading academics and ASPO among others) that would suggest a certain amount of populist 
infusion.  
Though there certainly are disagreements within the academic movement; Duncan’s (1996) 
extreme Olduvai theory stands in stark contrast to more moderate analysis of tourist developments 
over the coming decades in the wake of peak oil (depicted by Logar (2013) and Yeoman et al (2007) 
for instance). These disagreements can hardly be categorized as internal strife within the discourse. 
In fact the instances of internal criticism and inter-evaluation seem very low. The general 
development appears to be that of a progressive science where the theory is being fine-tuned and 
developed on the basis of new findings and more refined modelling in a highly positivistic manner. 
It is a discourse without signs of any ‘Kuhnian’ paradigm-shifts or attempts at ‘Popperian’ 
falsification. One could explain this on the basis of Swyngedouw’s (2010) fifth populist 
denominator; the lack of privileged subjects of change. Homogenization of the political subject (in 
this case the subject is ‘everyone’ and ‘all of global society’) is necessary due to the overwhelming 
and apocalyptical threat. To consider singulars (the marginalized and oppressed, alternative interest 
etc.) would only speed up the pace towards doom. Surely accounts of groups being privileged or 
disadvantaged as an effect of the coming change exist (see for instance Friedrichs’ (2010) 
geopolitical account for the probable development towards predatory militarism in the wake of 
peak oil), but such accounts are rarely explored and merely used to accentuate the universality 
(exceptions to the rule in the case of the privileged, and a further plead for urgency when it comes 
to the disadvantaged).  
While the inevitability of a new world order (one without cheap oil) is heralded in the discourse, 
there is an ideological vacuum when it comes to envisioning this new order. With few exceptions 
(see Foster’s (2002) Marxist account for sustainable ecology that by its logic inevitably lead to 
communism or Bryant’s (2007) thermodynamic economy, for instance) the discourse in general 
frames the issue and potential solutions within our current regime and calls upon the existing elites 
to act rather than for replacing them. In that tradition there is no Rancièrian counting of the 
uncounted or any proper names assigned to the theory. The majority of research is instead highly 
technical (see Bopp 1980, Jukić et al 2005, Michael 2011 etc.) and framed as informational (when 
is the peak here, how do we best calculate supply shortages) rather than a discourse with political 
subjects to be named and counted. Where names are assigned it is the old terms of ecology and 
sustainability rehashed and used without assigned contents (see Czúcz et al 2010). The use of empty 
signifiers and the tendency to address demands to the elites would constitute Swyngedouw’s (2010) 
sixth and seventh populist maneuvers. 
                                                 
16 Found on http://cornucopia.cornubot.se/ 
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Building on the above it is not controversial to claim that peak oil is usually captured in the negative 
rather than the positive. Where peak oil takes on an embodied vision (as we have seen it rarely does 
even that, and stick to somber technocratic accounts of geo-statistical nature), it is one of ‘doom 
and gloom unless…’, rather than a named socio-environmental desire waiting for realization. As 
such peak oil discourse fails to be and account for ideology. Peak oil does not promise remedy via 
an alternate world order, it presents a problem (the end of cheap oil) and in the best case attempts 
to move it around via managerial fixes (see Becken 2008 and Leigh 2011 for instance), and in the 
worst case conclude that we are indeed facing the end of times (Duncan 1996). It is however a 
diverse discourse, and as seen above (and discussed below) not all accounts are populist in and by 
themselves, and certain aspects transcends populism to promise proper rupture. It is rather the 
tendency of the discourse to move in a decisively populist direction.  
5.3 Normalizing the apocalypse 
In order to further shed some light on the temporal (dialectic) progression of the discourse and its 
conflicting elements we will look to another environmental topic, namely climate-induced 
migration (CM). Giovanni Bettini (2013) notes how over the past two decades the debate over CM 
has been highly polarized into two large fractions – the maximalist versus the minimalist 
perspectives. The main contestation between the registers17 was that of weather CM should be 
considered and dealt with as a security issue. The maximalist approach “preached with alarmist 
tones the compelling character of CM and stressed its security implications. This lead them either 
to fear that abrupt tides of ‘climate refugees’ would threaten regional stability and possible lead to 
armed conflicts […], or call for their protection” (Bettini 2013:2). The maximalist approach quickly 
lost ground in academia, but its alarmist tones and apocalyptical disposition was still reproduced in 
media and by NGOs towards the end of the last decade. This has however changed recently, and 
a more mundane register has ‘overcome’ this polarization. 
Bettini (2013) argues that this shift is more than the affirmation of one register over another, that 
it rather marks the emergence of a new register – and not in contestation with the previous two, 
but in replacement of. It is a register with softer tones dismantling friction between the previous 
registers. The alarmist tone is giving way for “milder and more consensual storylines about the 
fostering of human security and the enhancing of resilience […]. Security is still discussed, but 
articulated in the apparently more liberal terms of human security” (Bettini 2013:3). The new register 
is broader and more advanced than its predecessors, capable of accommodating for different 
perspectives. It surely represents an improvement of the debate from previous registers. The 
deterministic streaks and the tendency to pathologize migrations have been washed away and the 
register opens for a multi-causal understanding of migration phenomena. The re-contextualizing 
of CM into adaption strategies mainly stress the necessity to recognize the benefits of migration to 
economic development and individual welfare and conclude that “migration can have a decisive 
role in improving the economic conditions of the lower social strata” (Bettini 2013:11).  
Bettini (ibid) argues that despite the increased sophistication, this shift away from securitization 
(where CM is perceived as a threat; with tidal waves of refugees pressing on the boarders of regions 
and nations less affected by the environmental changes as the imprinted imagery) does not 
                                                 
17 Bettini defines a register as; “the contours of a debate and […] the discursive landscape in which different positions 
and discourses articulate and enter into contact (or conflict)” (Bettini 2013) 
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necessarily mark a democratization of the debate. While the register is seemingly more refined 
Bettini (ibid) means it pacifies the debate. The new register leaves no room for questioning its own 
grounds.  Rather; the more human tone and framing demarcates a move towards consolidation of 
the issue under neoliberal rule. The softening of tones are not solely the result of analytical 
advancement of the issue, but rather driven by political context and convenience. The pacification 
and mainstreaming of the issue has in much turned CM into an issue of governing rather than of 
politics. The new register envision policies of socio-economic control and for the governing of 
displaced populations by constructing subjects able to sustain good circulation and economic 
development.  
While Bettini (2013) never generalizes his findings and expands on the theory – of emerging 
registers pacifying antagonisms and quelling old registers – into other discourses; it might be well 
worth testing the hypothesis on peak oil. It is important to stress that the forthcoming is far from 
an exhaustive analysis and elaborate definition of registers within the peak oil discourse. It should 
still provide some insight into the potential/risk of peak oil heading into yet another direction 
where the antagonism towards present hegemony is pacified or even rendered into processes 
reproducing and fortifying current formations. Another dialectal dead end, where the discourse is 
reformulated and reproduced, but where supersession into a new ‘paradigm’ is actively discouraged; 
where emancipatory and politically empowering discourses are foreclosed by a managerial and post-
political stance.  
5.3.2 A softer peak oil? 
The first occurrences of peer-reviewed articles that has been (retroactively18) said to deal with peak 
oil in the wake of the very first article by Hubble, originates from the early 1970. The number of 
articles over the following decades is rather scarce, and aimed at examining and attempting to 
forecast future oil production in the same or similar manners of Hubbert. The coining of the term 
peak oil was still in the future and the scope of the articles were mostly attempts to combine 
economic pricing theory with various depletion models in order to asses depletion rates for a 
limited set of wells in various regions (Beenstock 1977, Bopp 1980 and Sterman et al. 1998 for 
example). US and UK are the prime cases of inquiry, mostly due the solidity and availability of 
empirics in those countries. At large these early articles are aimed at reaffirming or reinvigorating 
Hubberts conclusions from 1969 and are highly technical and relaying on mathematical modelling. 
Social impact of the proposed decline in oil production is barely mentioned, though some authors 
discuss the phenomena from a securitization point of view, addressing energy and foreign political 
policy. Renshaw (1988) for instance discuss the insufficient efforts from the Carter administration 
in stimulating national oil production and limiting wasteful oil use in light of diminishing 
production trends in the US as well as abroad. Rensburg (1981) discuss from similar point of view 
when analyzing strategic stockpiling programs and argues that resource and mineral scarcity is an 
issue of national security. 
The highly technological and method/model- developing approach of these early articles continue 
over all decades (see Ayeni et al 1992, Feygin 2004, Jukić et al. 2005 etc.). During the 90s articles 
articulating worries as to the effects of peak oil get more frequent however. They are still largely 
                                                 
18 The source material originates from a list of peer-reviewed articles linked from ASPO; 
http://www.peakoil.net/publications and are thus only articles written by ‘‘peak oil-ists’’  
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technological and oriented towards model improvement, but also address social aspects of peak 
oil. Collin Campbell (1992) focuses on the problem of measuring and pin pointing the peak, but 
also insists on the urgency in addressing the issue (without specifying who should address from 
where and how), and declares that “[t]he world is rapidly approaching a turning point when it has 
to face the consequences of an irreversible decline in oil production” (ibid 1992). Cutler J. 
Cleveland (1993) in turn offers an economic model supporting the peak oil discourse, he somewhat 
paradoxically adds that “[t]here is an urgent need to move beyond the debate about assumptions, 
theories, and methodology” (Cleveland 1993:125), a necessity that stems from the inevitable 
economic recession of his model as a result of peak oil. 
In the middle of the 90s we see the first tendencies towards apocalyptical imaginaries. In 1993 
Campbell declares that “[t]he situation is serious, and the political and economic implications are 
colossal” (Campbell 1993:1) and that “[t]o speak of an impending oil shock is an over- 
simplification. […] Next time, it will be not so much a shock but the onset of a permanent chronic 
condition, where the consumers will have to curb demand, whatever temporary shocks may occur” 
(ibid 18). Campbell do press the notion of a better future however. Pressing on the opportunity to 
develop our world in a better direction; “this challenge which is of critical importance for mankind 
in the 21st century. It will be a very different world, and grasping the greater hope, it may be a 
better one, but there is no time to lose in facing up to the adjustments that the end of cheap oil 
will impose on everyone” (Campbell 1993:19). Later in the decade Richard C. Duncan (1996) 
introduces the previously mentioned ‘Olduvai Theory´ that uses energy use per capita and 
thermodynamic laws to conclude that industrialization will be a very brief and temporary condition 
in human history and that we by 2100 will live in a post-industrial stone age. This is a stance that 
is present in several grass root movements mobilizing and preparing for peak oil by survivalist 
measures (see previous chapter). 
There are obviously a wide array of academics, politicians and other influential actors (oil 
corporations like Shell and BP, think tanks etcetera) that dismissed peak oil in its totality for various 
reasons (Aleklett 2013 gives a large number of examples). Those aside and focusing on the ‘‘peak 
oil-ists’’, there seems to be (using Bettini’s terminology) two registers emerging in academia over 
the 1980s until (and in some respects exceeding) the mid-2000s. The alarmists (like Duncan 1996 
and Leigh 2008) that puts us at a point of no return; where resistance is futile and all we can do is 
to fight for the last drop to put off the inevitable for ourselves for as long as possible, and the 
moderates (like Campbell) that despite apocalyptic imaginaries see hope for the future. What is 
lacking from both perspectives during this period (1990s and early 2000s) is a politicizing of the 
subject into emancipatory politics. The alarmist are more concerned about putting their notion of 
the end of the world across than formulating fruitful solutions within or as a challenge to 
hegemony, and the moderates halt their apocalypse just short of mentioning that there might be a 
bright future after all, as long as we address the problem (mentions of ‘how’ to address the problem 
is rarely mentioned however). 
During the end of the decade there is a visible change in tones however. As the discourse matures 
and peak oil in academia explodes19 there might be what Bettini (2013) noticed with regards to 
                                                 
19 In ASPOs own list of peer-reviewed articles (http://www.peakoil.net/publications/peer-reviewed-articles) 
regarding peak oil 108 out of 180 articles were published between 2007 and 2012 (18 articles annually on average), with 
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climate migration, an emergence of a new register. Peak oil is no longer exclusively discussed from 
a macro perspective, but put into practice in a range of new fields like rural change (Coventry 2011), 
tourism (Yeoman et al 2007, Becken 2008, Leigh 2011), city planning (May et al 2008). Inevitable 
global change as a consequence of peak oil is still at the forefront but there are indications of the 
emergence of a new (not a consolidation of the two previous) and broader register more advanced 
than its predecessors, a register accommodating for a number of perspectives. The deterministic 
streaks and the tendency to pathologize peak oil have been (though far from washed away) 
considerably softened. Becken (2008) for instance presses on the need to plan and think eco-
efficiently when it comes to tourism planning and Leigh about “harmonizing with the new realities” 
(Leigh 2011:165), stating that “those who harmonize with the trends, get on top of future history, 
before it gets on top of them” (ibid). 
While still rather weak in academia, this new register in peak-oil academia has grown all the stronger 
and more apparent in other forums. Peak oil is no longer a term reserved to obscure academics 
and survivalist, but invoked in the vocabularies of certain specters (right winged Malthusian think 
tanks, big oil corporations alike) of the hegemonic elite (Bettini 2013). At last year’s Nobel Dialogue 
week the chairman of BP, Carl Henric Svanberg offered the following; “We need to move as fast 
as we can as time is not on our side. […] We can’t pretend, for example, that climate change is not 
a serious issue. […]The challenge is therefore twofold: Firstly, to supply enough energy to meet 
demand, and secondly to do so in a sustainable way, balancing environmental concerns with 
economic prosperity” (Svanberg 2013). Talking about a peak in demand rather than supply he 
distances himself from much of the peak oil discourse, but concludes the same; that change is 
coming and that it is serious. The common denominator for this new register is the notion that 
with managerial fixes like increased commodification of carbon, and via eco-friendly and 
sustainable planning and policies we might survive the coming apocalypse. A stance that bare much 
similarities with the emerging register in the CM debate identified by Bettini (2013) – a highly 
pacifying one, and one mobilized under consolidation with the current neoliberal hegemony. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
Important to note is that this thesis only scratches on the surface of the peak oil discourse. It does 
not claim to give a full account for the diversity of movements and research into the field of 
depleting oil and its consequences for society. The aim is rather to shed light and to warn for what 
threatens to be a grave mistake; namely to suppose that peak oil by necessity offers a rupture of 
hegemony and a challenge to our current regime.  
To Rancière (2010a) politics is a strife against the logics of hegemony. Mouffe (2005) offers a 
constructive way for democratic doctrines to take in order for regimes to embrace this strife and 
to truly ‘be’ democratic and allow for politics proper. For her the path lies in the act of 
acknowledging that there are interests in society that cannot be reconciled via consensual 
negotiation, and it lies in trying to realize ‘battlefields’ where irreconcilable standpoints can face 
each other in ‘combat’. This can only be realized by creating clear rifts between government and 
opposition, between left and right, between yay- and nay-sayers. Failure in offering clear alternatives 
that highlights social differences risks creating a vacuum of ‘passion’, in turn forcing antagonism 
                                                 
the remaining 72 articles published between 1969 and 2007 (1.9 articles annually on average). Though this is far from 
any scientific research into the prevalence of peak oil discussions in academia, it gives a slight hint. 
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to take form in antidemocratic and populist movements, as popularly seen throughout Europe 
today. A Europe where ‘economism’ runs rampant and where the mere notion of alternatives to 
the current regime (save perhaps from some degree of fascist flirtation) are considered purely 
phantasmagorical (Swyngedouw 2011 discuss this at length).  
It is on this account that I want to direct my main criticism towards the contemporary peak oil 
discourse. While surely addressing a subject of (potentially very grave) concern, the discourse 
actively attempts to foreclose the very notion of politization of the subject. With apocalyptical 
imaginaries acting on one side (particularly in media, NGO’s and grassroot movements, but also 
to a large extent in academia), and with a consolidating register skewed towards managerial fixes 
within the hegemonic regime on the other; both work in tandem to exile the possibilities of real 
confrontation between properly defined alternatives and properly named political subjects. The 
‘battlefield’ that is supposed to both realize the acting out of alternatives against each other, but 
also manifest and make visible social strife that was previously hidden, has turned to a hollow and 
already conquered battlefield. It is hollow in the sense that by apocalyptic imaginaries and 
fetishization of oil, the subject of strife (a world without oil) has become an empty object/signifier. 
It is a battle of all of humanity against inevitable destruction, a battle that forecloses actual strife; 
an already conquered battlefield in the sense that the alternative to doom is presented as ‘business 
as usual’, with some managerial fixes. 
In the process of foreclosure and with the (intended or not) aim to consolidate hegemony a more 
moderate register in peak oil is appearing. It is important to note, that the tendencies towards the 
emergence of such a ‘mundane’ and pacifying register are still rather weak within the peak-oil 
academia. And that, though few, there are exceptionally intriguing and potentially hegemony 
breaking theories and models within the discourse. Hall and Klintgaard (2006) for instance call for 
a complete overhaul of our economic system into what they call ‘biophysical economics’, a move 
away from neoliberal market economy. In and by itself far from emancipatory, it does offer radical 
change. In a similar approach Bryant (2007) offers a thermodynamic model of a money system 
where he attempt to relate “interest rates, the rate of return, money demand and the velocity of 
circulation to entropy gain” (ibid:303) and where measurement of economic value is translated into 
thermodynamic terms. A construct that in itself does not challenge hegemonic power relation or 
offer emancipation, but potentially radical change and a possible break with hegemonic economy, 
a rupture where the possibility of proper strife and the articulation of alternatives and antagonisms 
open up for politics proper.  
In a completely different approach Paul Tranter and Scott Sharpe (2007) call for a fundamental 
reconceptualization of children from passive receptacles of parental consumer desires to important 
social agents able to express themselves in the present. Using the animated blockbuster movie 
Monsters Inc. as an allegory they argue for emancipation of children as the engine in a cultural shift 
towards general peak oil awareness. While this approach certainly calls for emancipatory politics, it 
might however fail to address the hegemony of the neoliberal paradigm. But it offers a certain strife 
without falling in the pit of apocalyptic imaginaries.   
Nevertheless, the ‘mundane’ register is seemingly gathering strength, and together with strictly 
apocalyptic imaginaries it threatens to act as a barrier against a proper politicization of peak oil. 
What is particularly dangerous in this process is that it threatens to play part of the Rancièrian 
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privatization of the public sphere. We stand to face either certain doom, or we rely on managerial 
fixes within our current hegemony. In short; we either suffer gruesomely or we trust in the power 
of capitalism to work it out for us. The severe lack of alternatives, of challenges to hegemony 
threaten to shade our view, to obscure and hide the potentiality of radical change, degradation via 
business as usual instead of supersession out of our oppressive hegemony into expanded 
democratization. When being challenged by apocalyptic imaginaries on the one hand, and a 
mundane register that acknowledges potential but radical change while still promising managerial 
fixes to deal with the issue – it is not strange that we feel content with the latter outlook. And 
would we for a moment be tempted to radicalize, we immediately stand to face the apocalypse. 
This foreclosure of politics proper; of inclusion politics of Žižek (2009) or agonistic politics of 
Mouffe (2005), this Rancièrian privatization of the public, might prove to be more catastrophic 
than the notion of a world with more expensive and less abundant oil. 
Theoretically however, there is light in the tunnel. The dialectic movement strives for supersession 
by its inherent laws. That is not to say we should rely on the deterministic strides towards 
communism that Marx proposed. Capitalism has proven to be much more resilient than what Marx 
believed. Nonetheless, within the discourse, the set of phenomena that is peak oil – lies the 
potentiality of supersession, a groundbreaking supersession with the prospective to shake 
hegemony. It is my hope that we pay heed to the dangers of reproducing old systems when trying 
to overcome challenges that loom ahead, and that we take the road of proper radicalization and 
make discourses such as peak oil into vessels of proper political and radical change. 
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